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Abstract 
After coming close to extinction, the grey wolf (Canis lupus) has re-colonized Scandinavia 
during the last two decades. The current population numbers some 100–120 individuals, and 
is distributed in small packs along the Swedish–Norwegian border. However, with wolf re-
colonization, several conflicts have arisen. One conflict is due to wolf predation on livestock, 
especially sheep and reindeer. Another is predation on wild ungulates. As the wolves have 
shown a strong preference for moose (Alces alces) in this respect, a smaller moose population 
is available for game hunting. The cost of increased moose predation by wolves is examined 
using a two-step process. First, we analyse the costs to landowners, comprising the loss of 
animals potentially available for hunting less the reduction in browsing damage associated 
with a smaller moose population. Second, we examine the problem from a broader point of 
view, where costs external to landowners and local communities are included. By far the most 
important cost here is damage related to collisions between moose and motor vehicles. 
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1. Introduction 
In very many instances, wild animals provide benefits for humans. Quite frequently, however, 
we may also find that these species incur economic costs. Rodents damaging agricultural 
production are a typical example (see, e.g., Stenseth et al. 2003). In other instances, wild 
animals are simultaneously a nuisance and valuable. Large herbivores, for example, may 
cause grazing damage, but provide value through hunting or trapping (see, e.g., Zivin et al. 
2000). Nuisance may also be channelled through ecological interaction. Some marine species 
are of this type, where whales, for example, prey upon or compete with commercially 
valuable species, like cod (Flaaten and Stollery 1996). This also holds for terrestrial animal 
species, for example where bears and wolves prey upon wild ungulates in addition to 
livestock. Graham et al. (2005) provides an overview of these conflicts, making a distinction 
between predation–livestock conflicts and predator–game conflicts. 
 
In the middle of the 1960’s, the grey wolf (Canis lupus) was regarded as functionally extinct 
in Norway and Sweden (the Scandinavian peninsula). In the last part of the 1970’s the first 
confirmed reproduction in 14 years was recorded. Since this first reproduction in northern 
Sweden, all new reproductions have been located in south-central parts of the Scandinavian 
peninsula (Wabakken et al. 2001).  The re-colonized wolf population in Scandinavia now 
numbers some 100–120 individuals which live in small family groups, or packs, in the 
western-central part of Sweden and along the border area between Norway and Sweden 
(Wabakken et al. 2001). Although the population is still small in number, wolf re-colonization 
is already associated with several conflicts. One conflict is due to predation on livestock, 
including sheep and reindeer (Linnell et al. 1996). While the total loss is quite modest, some 
farmers in a few areas have been seriously affected (Environmental Department 2003). The 
predation on wild ungulates is another conflict, especially where the wolf shows a particularly 
strong preference for moose (Alces alces) (Milner et al. 2005). As a consequence, a smaller 
moose population is available for hunting. The problem of moose predation also takes place in 
only a few areas, but has caused great concern in rural Scandinavia because moose is by far 
the most important hunting game species, with about 40,000 and 100,000 animals (with a 
mean body weight of about 190 kg for adult females and 240 kg for adult males) shot every 
year in Norway and Sweden, respectively (Gundersen 2003). In addition, moose hunting in 
September/October is an important, if not the most important, social and cultural event taking 
place in many rural communities. 
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In this paper, the moose predation cost of the recent wolf re-colonization is analysed. The 
problem is examined using a two-step process. First, the cost to the landowners is studied. 
According to Scandinavian wildlife laws, landowners are given the hunting value of the 
moose. At the same time, when practising forestry, they bear the cost of browsing damage, 
mostly taking place during the winter when young pine trees are the main food source for the 
moose (Storaas et al. 2001). The economic loss to the landowners due to wolf predation 
consists therefore of two components; the loss of animals potentially available for hunting 
minus the reduced browsing damage due to a smaller moose population. This loss, however, 
depends on the landowner’s management goals and hunting practices. Next, we look at the 
problem from an overall point of view, which includes the cost due to moose–vehicle 
collisions. This cost is found to be considerable, and recent estimates indicate that it may be 
even higher than the meat value of the moose (Storaas et al. 2001). Both the landowners cost 
and the overall scheme is studied in ecological equilibrium. 
 
The relationship between wolf and moose is highly interactive, mainly determined by the 
functional response of the wolf population to the moose population. There may also be a 
reverse numerical response if the moose population influences the wolf population growth. 
Wolf–moose ecology has been studied extensively in North America and to a lesser extent in 
Scandinavia (Nilsen et al. 2005). However, very few studies include any economic 
considerations. For exceptions, see Tu and Wilman (1992) and Boman et al. (2003). Tu and 
Wilman analyse the wolf–moose relationship using a Verhulst-Pearl type model. The aim of 
their study was to see how various predator control programs affected the dynamics of the 
ecological system when uncertainty was included. As mentioned, we are only concerned with 
ecological equilibrium. Boman et al. analysed bio-economic aspects of the dispersal pattern of 
wolf expansion in Sweden and where predation on moose was taken into account, but no 
moose population growth function was explicitly specified. In the present study, we focus on 
the moose population relationship, but ignore dispersal. Our analysis therefore draws more on 
the general bio-economic pest and nuisance literature (see, e.g., Zivin et al. 2000 and 
Huffaker et al. 1992).  
 
In the following we are considering an area of fixed size with a moose population coexisting 
with a wolf population. One or more landowners manage the moose hunting in this area and if 
more landowners, they are in sum assumed to behave as a single agent. We start by 
formulating the ecological model in Section 2. The cost and benefit functions to the 
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landowners follow in Section 3. In Section 4 we analyse the various moose management goals 
and assess the economic loss of wolf predation. Altogether, four harvesting scenarios are 
analysed. Section 5 provides a numerical illustration using a real life example from the 
Koppang area (located some 300 km north of Oslo). In Section 6, the cost of moose–vehicle 
collisions external to the landowner is included, and the wolf predation is then studied from a 
more overall perspective. 
 
2. Moose–wolf interaction 
While the recently re-colonized Scandinavian wolf population is small in number and patchily 
distributed, the density of the Scandinavian moose population is generally high. The main 
reasons for the latter are the previous near-absence of predators, the last decade’s highly 
selective moose harvesting scheme focusing on young males and calves, and good growth 
conditions associated with changing forestry practices (Ostgard 1987, Saether et al. 1992).The 
moose population size has accordingly increased significantly during the last 30 years or so in 
both Sweden and Norway. In Norway it increased from about 15,000 in the in the beginning 
of the 1970’s to today’s level of about 125,000. At the same time, the yearly number of moose 
hunted increased from about 6,000 to close to 40,000 (Ostgard 1987, Milner et al. 2005). 
 
Moose–wolf ecology has been subject to several intensive studies in North America. From 
these studies it appears clear that wolves, when present, influence the abundance of moose 
(Peterson 1999, Hayes and Harestad 2000). The Scandinavian ecosystem, however, differs 
from the North American system as the moose density is generally higher, the age and sex 
structures differ because of selective hunting schemes with a higher proportion of harvesting 
of calves and young males (Solberg et al. 2000) and harvesting accounts for a much higher 
proportion of total mortality (>85%; Saether et al. 1992). Wolf density in Scandinavia is also 
much lower, and more patchily distributed (Wabakken et al. 2001). The moose–wolf ratio is 
thus higher in Scandinavia, and the impact of wolf predation is likely to be of a more local 
nature. Wolf predation is focused on calves, yearlings, and older females, with calves as the 
main food source. The predation rates reported from Scandinavia also appear to be higher 
than those in North America, which may indicate that predation, for a given size of wolf pack, 
increases with moose density (Nilsen et al. 2005). 
 
Based on the above cited studies, it is assumed that wolf predation represents an additional 
source of mortality for calves, yearlings, and older females. In our biomass framework, the 
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natural growth of the moose population then translates into two terms; growth in the absence 
of wolves minus mortality through predation. While predation tends to increase with the size 
and number of the wolf packs, there is controversy over how it is related to the size of the 
moose stock. It is generally accepted that the predation increases in the moose stock at low 
densities, but it is more unclear what happens at medium and high moose densities. In what 
follows a general functional form is used which may include a lower marginal predation 
effect at higher densities. A linear functional form, however, is applied in the numerical 
illustrations meaning that the predation rate is constant (section 5 below). 
 
While predation is determined by the size and number of wolf packs together with the size of 
the moose population, there may also be a feedback effect as the size of the moose population 
influences wolf population growth. However, in areas with colonizing carnivore populations, 
or carnivore populations strongly controlled, as in Scandinavia (Environmental Department 
2003), this relationship will appear less interactive meaning that the wolves are not able to 
respond numerically to variations in the moose population (Nilsen et al. 2005). Any numerical 
response of the wolf population is hence neglected and the size of the wolf population, or 
equivalently, the predation pressure, is determined outside the model. Our reduced-form 
ecological model has therefore the same structure as the Flaaten and Stollery (1996) model 
analysing the economic loss of the fisheries along the Norwegian coast and the Northeast 
Atlantic due to a given amount of minke whale predation.  
 
When neglecting any stochastic variations in environment and biology, the equation 
 
(1)  1 ( ) ( , )t t t t tX X F X G W X h+ − = − −  
 
gives the growth of the moose population where tX  is the population size in year t , measured 
as the number of animals (or biomass), 0th ≥  is the harvest in the same year (also as the 
number of animals), and ( )tF X  is the density-dependent natural growth function in absence 
of wolf predation. (.)F  is assumed to be of the standard logistic type with / ' 0tF X F∂ ∂ = >  
for a ‘small’ population and ' 0F <  when t msyX X>  (additional details provided below). 
( , )tG W X  is the predation term where W is the size of the wolf pack, assumed exogenous 
throughout the analysis, with (0, ) 0tG X =  and / 0WG W G∂ ∂ = > . The size of the moose 
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stock generally influences predation as well, ( ,0) 0G W =  and 0XG ≥ , while the marginal 
effect may be reduced when the moose density becomes higher (see above), 0XXG ≤ . 
Finally, 0XWG ≥  is assumed to hold. See Figure 1. 
 
 Figure 1 about here 
 
The different management options are analysed only in ecological equilibrium. There are two 
reasons for this. First, equilibrium harvesting (of various types, see below) is the usually 
practice is Scandinavia. Moreover, as transitional dynamics and hence the time profile of the 
cost of predation depend on the chosen initial situation, nothing comparative can be said about 
the various harvesting schemes in a dynamic framework. In ecological equilibrium we have 
( ) ( , ) 0F X G W X h− − =  which defines the prey isocline. The prey isocline is always assumed 
to be downward sloping. Under, say, a fixed quota harvesting scheme with h  constant (see 
below), the slope reads / /( ' )W XdX dW G F G= − . When negative, ( , )G W X h+  therefore 
intersects with ( )F X  from below. It is easily recognized that this implies dynamic stability. 
 
3. The cost and benefit to landowners 
The landowners receive the hunting value of the moose. Their net benefit is determined by 
hunting income minus the browsing cost due to the damage to young pine trees. The yearly 
hunting income is given as ph  (the time subscript is dropped) where p  is the hunting licence 
price. In what follows, it is assumed that p  is fixed and independent of the harvest and stock 
size. This is justified by the fact that there is competition among a large number of suppliers 
of hunting licences in Scandinavia. Following the practice in Norway, a licence allows the 
buyer to kill one animal, which is paid for only if the animal is killed. In reality, each hunter 
also pays a (small) fixed fee independent of whether any animal is shot or not, but this fee 
component is neglected. 
 
The damage on young pine trees occurs mainly during the winter and varies with the quality 
of the timber stand and the productivity of the forest. The damage may take place 
immediately, and the damaged young pine trees be replaced directly, but quite frequently 
there is a time lag between the occurrence of browsing and the economic loss of the damage. 
In such instances, however, discounting is not explicitly taken into account. A simple, but 
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realistic, way to account for the browsing cost is to relate it to the size of the moose 
population, ( )tD D X=  with (0) 0D =  and ' 0D >  (see also Zivin et al. 2000). The yearly net 
benefit, or profit, to the landowners in year t  reads accordingly: 
 
(2) ( ) ( )W ph D Xπ = − . 
 
The economic loss of the landowners due to predation is therefore the profit (2) in the absence 
of wolf predation minus the profit with wolf predation. The loss is then made up of two 
components; a change in the harvestable population and a change in the stock size causing 
browsing damage. The loss may also be negative, i.e. there is a gain, if the reduced browsing 
damage exceeds the reduced harvesting income. To account for the loss (or gain), however, 
the management goal of the landowners has to be specified as the harvest and stock size, and 
hence profit are related to the harvesting strategy employed. 
 
4. The various management scenarios of landowners 
According to Norwegian wildlife law, the State, through the Directorate for Wildlife and 
Nature Management (‘Direktoratet for Naturforvaltning’) in cooperation with the local 
wildlife authorities and the landowners, determines the number and composition (calves, 
juveniles, adult females, and adult males) of moose to be hunted within each management 
area. However, all the time the hunting value is obtained by the landowners (see above). The 
management goal is usually to maximize the meat value in an ecological equilibrium (Saether 
et al. 1992). Browsing damage may be taken into account, but often in an ad hoc manner. 
However, because of uncertainty of various types, lack of information, and so on, this 
management goal is generally implemented by landowners in a pragmatic manner, which in 
most instances, if not always, is reduced to simple goals concerning the equilibrium 
population size and/or the harvest (see Lande et al. 2003 for a general discussion and analysis 
in light of uncertainty). 
 
The cost of predation is studied in light of such pragmatic harvesting strategies, and the 
following management options are analysed: (a) threshold harvesting (keeping a constant 
stock over time); (b) proportional harvesting (harvesting a fixed fraction of the population 
every year); and (c) harvesting a fixed number (quota) of animals every year. These three 
strategies are compared with a harvesting strategy giving the highest economic outcome for 
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landowners: (d) maximizing the present value of profits. As mentioned, all management 
schemes are evaluated at the ecological equilibrium. 
 
(a) Threshold harvesting 
Threshold harvesting, or keeping a constant stock level aX , may typically be related to the 
maximum sustainable yield level, or other ‘sustainable’ population levels. In ecological 
equilibrium we have ( ) ( , ) 0a a aF X G W X h− − =  where 0ah ≥  indicates the threshold of 
harvesting. When 0ah >  and aX  is constant, / 0a Wdh dW G= − <  and any increased 
predation are exactly balanced by a reduced outtake. The economic loss due to wolf predation 
is then simply the reduced harvesting income: 
 
(3) ( ) ( , ) 0
a
a
W
d W pG W X
dW
π = − < . 
 
The marginal profit loss is thus proportional to the harvesting price, and is non-decreasing in 
the threshold level aX , as we have 0WXG ≥ . 
 
(b) Proportional harvesting 
Proportional harvesting follows as h Xγ= , with 0γ >  as the fixed harvesting fraction. When 
inserted into the population equilibrium this yields ( ) ( , ) 0b b bF X G W X Xγ− − = , where 
bX indicates the equilibrium stock. Differentiation gives / /( ' )b W XdX dW G F G γ= − −  and is 
negative when [ ( , ) ]G W X Xγ+  intersects with ( )F X  from below and we have dynamic 
stability (cf. Section 2). Following this harvesting rule, the moose stock is therefore lower 
with wolf predation than without predation. Accordingly, the equilibrium harvest, b bh Xγ= , 
will  be lower as well. 
 
However, as both the number of animals harvested and the stock become lower, harvesting 
income and browsing damage decrease. Hence, the profit effect is ambiguous: 
 
(4) [ '( )] ( , )( )
[ '( ) ( , ) ]
b bb
W
b b
X
p D X G W Xd W
dW F X G W X
γπ
γ
−= − − . 
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We therefore find that the presence of wolf predation, or equivalently, a larger wolf pack, 
reduces the profit of landowners if, and only if, the marginal harvesting income dominates the 
marginal browsing damage, such that ( ') 0p Dγ − > . The moose population size is then above 
that of the static profit maximization condition, and an additional moose consumed by the 
wolf pack leads to an allocation further away from that maximum (see also below). In the 
opposite situation where ( ') 0p Dγ − < , higher predation pressure increases the profit of the 
landowners as reduced marginal damage dominates the reduced harvesting income. 
 
(c) Fixed quota hunting 
Following a fixed quota management rule, the ecological equilibrium condition is 
( ) ( , ) 0c c cF X G W X h− − =  where 0ch ≥  indicates the fixed quota and cX  the accompanying 
stock level. Differentiating yields / /( ' ) 0c W XdX dW G F G= − <  under the assumption of 
dynamic stability (again, see Section 2). The presence of wolf, or higher wolf predation 
pressure, will therefore unambiguously increase profit: 
 
(5) '( ) ( , )( ) 0
[ '( ) ( , )]
c cc
W
c c
X
D X G W Xd W
dW F X G W X
π = − >− . 
 
At the cost of a smaller and less ‘sustainable’ moose population (but see the numerical results 
below), landowners will benefit from wolf predation. However, the harvesting quota cannot 
be ‘too large’. If the predation pressure is substantial, then there are simply not enough moose 
to sustain a harvest. We also find that a higher quota always means a smaller stock under the 
assumption of dynamic stability; that is ( , )G W X h+ intersects with ( )F X from below (cf. 
above and Figure 1). A higher quota, for any given predation pressureW , leads accordingly to 
reduced browsing damage. The profit therefore increases. 
 
(d) Maximizing present-value profit 
The above harvesting schemes are now compared with a scenario of present-value profit 
maximization. This harvesting strategy hence follows by maximizing 
1
0
[ ( )]
T
t
t tph D Xρ
−
−∑  
subject to the ecological growth equation (1), where T is the planning period and 
1/(1 )ρ δ= +  is the discount factor with 0δ ≥  as the (annual) discount rate. The planning 
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period, or number of years taken into account, is presumably long, or infinite, meaning that no 
scrap value, i.e., no final value of the moose population, is included in the objective function. 
 
The current-value Hamiltonian of this problem (see, e.g., Conrad and Clark 1987) is 
1( ) [ ( ) ( , ) ]t t t t t tH ph D X F X G W X hρλ += − + − −  where 1tλ +  is the resource shadow price (‘the 
value of the moose in the forest’). The first-order conditions for the maximum yield 
1 0tp ρλ +− =  and 1 1' ( ' )t t t XD F Gρλ λ ρλ+ +− = − −  when an interior solution is assumed to take 
place (a positive stock size and harvesting taking place at the steady state). The interpretations 
of these conditions are standard. The dynamics will typically be of the Most Rapid Approach 
Path (MRAP-dynamics) as the Hamiltonian is linear in the control. Suggested that the steady 
state is reachable from the initial position 0X  (see also the concluding section), the so-called 
‘golden rule condition’ becomes: 
 
(6) 
*
* *'( )'( ) ( , )X
D XF X G W X
p
δ− − = . 
 
This condition indicates that the net internal rate of return of the moose population should 
equal the external rate of return δ . Multiplying by p and rearranging, the golden rule 
condition also indicates that the net marginal value of the moose population ‘in the forest’, 
( ' ) 'Xp F G D− − , should be equal to the marginal harvesting value ‘in the bank’, pδ . 
Following condition (6), the stock size will always be below the maximum sustainable harvest 
level *'( ) 0F X > , or * msyX X< . Discounting, as well as browsing damage and predation work 
in that direction. When the rate of discount is zero, 0δ = , it can easily be shown that solution 
(6) coincides with the solution of the problem of maximizing current profit (2) at ecological 
equilibrium. 
 
Differentiation of (6) yields * / /( '' ''/ ) 0XW XXdX dW G F D p G= − − ≤ , as the numerator is 
negative because of the second-order conditions for a maximum. The steady-state harvest 
follows as * * *( ) ( , )h F X G W X= − , and predation also reduces the harvest, 
* */ ( ' )( / ) 0X Wdh dW F G dX dW G= − − < . The profit * * *( ) ( )W ph D Xπ = −  shifts accordingly 
as: 
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(7) 
* *
* * * *( ) { [ '( ) ( , )] '( )} ( , ) 0X W
d W dXp F X G W X D X pG W X
dW dW
π = − − − < , 
 
which is also negative because [ ( ' ) '] 0Xp F G D− − ≥  holds for the golden rule condition (6). 
Predation therefore lowers the profitability under this harvesting scheme because it represents 
one more constraint for the profit maximising landowner. As both harvesting income and 
browsing damage decrease, the reduced harvesting income dominates the reduced browsing 
damage. When 0δ =  and equation (6) coincides with current profit maximizing, condition (7) 
reduces to *( ) / 0Wd W dW pGπ = − < , which may also be confirmed using the envelope 
theorem. The effect is then the same as in the threshold harvesting case (a), except that they 
generally occur at different stock levels. 
 
5. Numerical illustration 
5.1 Data and specific functional forms 
The harvesting schemes are now numerically illustrated using data from the Koppang area, 
some 300 km north of Oslo, Norway. The intention is not to carry out an ‘accurate’ cost-
benefit calculation as these simulations only mirror some qualitative aspects of wolf 
predation. A wolf pack settled in this region in 1997 in an area of about 600 square km, with a 
moose population of about 1,000 individuals. Since then the number of wolves has been 
between 5 and 12 individuals. The wolf population is strictly controlled (Environmental 
Department 2003). The yearly predation, mainly calves and yearlings, has been difficult to 
assess, but Gundersen (2003) states it is in the range 0-18 moose/wolf/100 days. The number 
of moose harvested has decreased during the last years (Milner et al. 2005) which may be 
consistent with a smaller population governed by a proportional harvesting strategy (see also 
below). 
 
As mentioned, the natural growth rate of the moose population in the absence of predation is 
assumed to be of a standard logistic type ( ) (1 / )t t tF X rX X K= −  with r  as the maximum 
specific growth rate and K  as the carrying capacity. The functional response of the wolf 
population is specified as a Cobb–Douglas function, ( , )G W X WX βα=  with 0α >  and 
0 1β< ≤ . For simplicity, 1β =  is used in the following calculations although there are good 
reasons to believe that there is some decreasing effect in the number of moose (Section 2 
above). The predation rate, as a growth rate, is then fixed by Wα .  We also use a linear 
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browsing-damage function ( )D X aX=  with 0a >  as the fixed damage cost per moose. For 
these functional forms, routine calculations yield ecological equilibrium profit under the 
various management schemes as: ( ) [ (1 / ) ]a a a aW pX r X K W aXπ α= − − − , 
( ) ( / )( )( )b W K r p a r Wπ γ α γ= − − − , 
2( ) ( / 2 )[( ) ( ) 4 / ]c c cW ph a K r r W r W rh Kπ α α= − − + − − , and 
* 2 2 2 2( ) ( / 4 )[ 2( ) ( / ) ( ) ]W p K r r r W a p Wπ δ δ α α= − − − − + ( / 2 )[ ( / ) ]a K r r a p Wδ α+ − − − . 
Under the fixed quota scheme (c), there will generally be two solutions for the stock size, and 
where the highest stock value is in accordance with dynamic stability (again, see above). 
Hence, cπ  for obvious reasons (same harvesting income and lower grazing damage) yields a 
lower profit than the dynamically unstable solution. 
 
The following parameter values are based on Skonhoft and Olaussen (2005), Gundersen 
(2003) and Nilsen et al. (2005). The maximum specific growth rate is given as 0.47r =  while 
the carrying capacity is 3,500K =  (number of moose), which implies about 5.8 moose per 
square km. We study three alternative predation pressures with 0.05Wα =  as the baseline 
value. This yields a yearly predation of somewhat below 90 individuals for a population size 
of, say, / 2 1,750msyX K= = . The high predation pressure of 0.10Wα =  and no predation at 
all, 0Wα = , are contrasted with this baseline value. The hunting licence price is fixed as 
8,000p = (NOK per moose, 2003 prices), while the marginal damage cost follows as 300a =  
(NOK per moose, 2003 prices). We assume no discount in the calculations reported below, 
0δ = , meaning that the steady state of the present-value maximizing scenario (d) coincides 
with equilibrium harvesting profit maximizing (see above). 
 
Results 
Table 1 reports the results when there is no predation, 0Wα = , and where the stock size 
under the threshold harvesting scenario (a) is / 2 1,750a msyX X K= = =  (number of moose), 
the harvesting fraction under the proportional harvesting  scenario (b) is 0.3γ = , and the 
harvesting quota under the fixed harvesting quota scenario (c) is 200ch =  (number of 
moose). The harvesting fraction under (b) is more or less in accordance with the most recent 
situation (Gundersen 2003) while the fixed harvesting quota scheme (c) yields an outtake well 
below the harvest under the other schemes when there is no predation. The fixed harvesting 
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fraction scheme (b) gives results quite close to the profit maximizing scenario (d), while the 
fixed quota scheme (c) yields a substantially higher stock. As a consequence, the browsing 
damage becomes substantial and depresses profitability. 
 
 Table 1 about here 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the effects under the baseline predation pressure (Table 2) and when 
the predation pressure is high (Table 3). When compared with the no predation scenario, it 
can be seen that the cost of predation is substantial under the threshold harvesting scheme (a) 
as the surplus stock available for harvesting decreases significantly with higher predation. The 
loss is 25% and 51% under the baseline predation and the high predation assumption, 
respectively. The relative loss is even higher under the fixed harvesting fraction scenario (b) 
which is somewhat surprising as the profitability effect of predation here is generally unclear. 
However, because ( ') ( ) (8,000 0.3 300) 0p D p aγ γ− = − = × − >  (cf. Section 4), higher 
pressure also reduces the profit under this management strategy. The predation cost according 
to the profit maximizing scheme (d) follows very much the same pattern, with the more 
modest loss of 12% and 41% under the baseline alternative and high predation pressure, 
respectively. On the contrary, and in line with the analytical exposition, profitability improves 
with predation under the fixed quota scenario (c), and increases 20% under the baseline 
predation pressure compared with no predation. 
 
 Table 2 about here 
 
Sensitivity analysis for the management schemes (a), (b), and (c) is also conducted with 
different values for the stock threshold level, harvesting fraction, and harvesting quota, 
respectively. When the threshold stock level is lowered, we find that the economic viability 
under the threshold scheme (a) worsens as reduced harvesting income dominates reduced 
browsing damage. However, the cost of predation also becomes less significant. With, say, 
/ 2 875a msyX X= =  (number of moose), we find 2,205aπ =  (1,000 NOK) without predation, 
which reduces to 1,855aπ =  under the baseline predation pressure. The loss is therefore 
somewhat lower than the previous high threshold level case; just 16 % compared to a previous 
loss of 25% (Table 2). When the harvesting fraction under scenario (b) is reduced, more or 
less the same picture emerges so long as ( ) 0p aγ − >  holds (see above). 
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 Table 3 about here 
 
6. The social planner solution and the social benefit of predation 
So far landowners have determined the harvest and moose population for a given wolf 
predation pressure. This may be considered as an institutional outcome where the landowners 
have property rights (hunting rights) over the moose population, while being corrected for one 
externality, the public good value of the wolf population (see, e.g., Bromley 1991). The in-
situ value of the wolf population that just balances the predation cost may also be calculated 
under his property rights scheme, and is indicated by VW 1. When adding VW and illustrating 
by using harvesting scheme (d), we find that the social surplus is 
( ) ( ) 2,179S W W VW VWπ= + = +  under the baseline predation pressure assumption, and 
where the first term is the landowner profit (again, see Table 2).  Comparing the landowner 
profit in the absence of predation, and hence neglecting the wolf value, (0) (0) 2,786S π= =  
(Table 1), we find that ( ) (0)S W S>  implies (2,786 2,179) 607VW > − =  (1,000 NOK). The 
in-situ social value of the wolf population must therefore be at least 607 to yield a positive 
social gain of predation under the baseline predation pressure and the profit maximizing 
harvesting scheme (d). Likewise, we find that under the high predation pressure (Table 3), 
(2,786 1,647) 1,139VW > − =  (1,000 NOK) must hold if predation, on this premise, should be 
socially desirable. 
 
However, to better assess the social cost or gain of predation, more cost and benefit 
components should be included. The single most important of these is the damage related to 
moose–vehicle and moose–railway collisions. These costs can be considerable (see the 
introductory section) and are, to a large extent, experienced by people living outside the 
various ‘moose areas’. This is also the case in the chosen study area as the traffic damage 
mostly occurs on the highway and railway connecting Norway’s main cities, Oslo and 
Trondheim, which run through the area. For landowners (as well as the local community) in 
the Koppang area, the cost related to moose–vehicle collisions is therefore basically external. 
 
                                                 
1 It should be emphasised that this represents no intention to try to calculate the existence money value of the 
Scandinavian wolf. This is difficult, if not meaningless, but see Boman and Bostedt (1999) and Dahle et al. 
(1987) for serious attempts. 
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A simple, yet realistic, way to account for the moose–vehicle damage is, as for the browsing 
damage, to relate it to the population size as more moose, ceteris paribus, mean more damage 
(Gundersen 2003) and a higher yearly cost. That is: 
 
(8) ( )t tT T X=  
 
with (0) 0T =  and ' 0T > . Neglecting further cost and benefit components (but see below), 
the yearly social benefit of the moose population is [ ( ) ( )]t t tph D X T X− − . When assuming 
that W  reflects the socially desirable size of the wolf pack (more on this below), present-
value maximizing 
1
0
[ ( ) ( )]
T
t
t t tph D X T Xρ
−
− −∑  yields the golden rule of the social planner 
solution as: 
 
(9) '( ) '( )'( ) ( , )
s s
s s
X
D X T XF X G W X
p
δ+− − = , 
 
where superscript ‘s’ indicates the social planner solution. Compared to the golden rule of the 
present-value profit maximization scheme of the landowners (6), we find *sX X< , and hence 
also *sh h<  because *X  as well as sX  are below that of msyX . Compared to the other 
management schemes not very much more can be said, as the differences hinge on the 
parameterization of these models. We therefore concentrate on comparing the steady state of 
harvesting scheme (d) with the social planner solution. 
 
The social gain (or loss) of predation when traffic damage cost is included is examined using 
the same functional forms and parameter values as above. In addition, and in line with the 
application of a linear browsing-damage function, we also introduce a linear traffic-damage 
function, ( )t tT X tX=  with 0t >  as the fixed damage cost per moose. Based on Storaas et al. 
(2001), 1,000t =  (NOK per moose, 2003 prices) is used as a baseline value. 0.05Wα = first 
illustrates the predation pressure representing the socially desirable size of the wolf 
population (Table 4.). 
 
 Table 4 about here 
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Harvesting scheme (d) implemented when the social value of the wolf population is neglected 
and the traffic damage costs are not taken into account, yields a landowner profit of 
(0) 2,786π =  (1,000 NOK) (Table 1). When subtracting the traffic damage cost, the social 
surplus becomes (0) (0) ( )S T Xπ= − = 2,786 1,610 1,176− = . On the other hand, profit 
maximization implemented when correcting for the external traffic damage cost, but still not 
accounting for the public good value of the wolf population, yields a significantly lower stock 
(and offtake), and reduces the landowner profit to (0) 2,553π = . The social surplus, however, 
increases to (0) (0) ( )S T Xπ= − = 2,553 1,145 1,408− = . Finally, the social surplus of the 
social planner solution becomes ( ) ( ) ( )S W W T X VWπ= − + =  1,947 959 988VW VW− + = + . 
Under the baseline predation pressure of 0.05Wα = , we hence find that ( )S W > (0)S , which 
means that (1,408 988) 420VW > − =  (1,000 NOK) to yield a positive social value of 
predation. This in-situ value is well below what was found when the traffic damage cost was 
not included. 
 
We have also studied what happens under other predation pressure assumptions, and shifting 
the pressure from 0.05Wα =  to 0.10Wα =  increases this break-even VW  value from 420 to 
767 (1,000 NOK). See also Figure 2 where break-even VW values are calculated for a whole 
range of predation rates under the baseline economic conditions. The break-even values may 
also be calculated under other price and cost assumptions, and not surprisingly they shift 
upward when the hunting becomes more valuable, and downward with a higher traffic 
damage cost (Figure 2). For example, when the traffic damage cost shifts from 1,000 to 1,500  
(NOK per moose), we find that the break-even  VW  value decreases from 420 to 327 under 
the baseline predation pressure assumption. 
 
 Figure 2 about here 
 
The social gain or cost of predation may also be found under the other management schemes 
but, as already indicated, nearly everything depends on the parameterization of these models. 
We therefore just briefly examine the fixed fraction harvesting scheme (b) when 0.3γ = . 
When the public good value of the wolf population is disregarded and there is no predation, 
this scheme yields the social surplus of (0) (0) ( )S T Xπ= − =  (2,659 – 1,266) = 1,393 (again, 
see Table 1). When compared with the social planner solution of 
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( ) ( ) ( )S W W T X VWπ= − + =  (988 )VW+ , we find that 405VW > to yield a positive social 
value of predation. This result is therefore very much the same as e found under the profit 
maximisation scenario (d). 
 
These calculations are, as noted, only of an illustrative character, as additional value 
components should be included in a more complete cost–benefit analysis. Such values may 
include, amongst other things, a positive non-consumptive moose population stock value 
(viewing value, etc.) and the cost of the wolf pack due to livestock predation. However, 
because of the large number of moose in Scandinavia, the in situ value of moose is expected 
to be quite small, if not negligible, at the margin. The livestock predation cost of the wolf is 
also thought to be quite small, but could be of significance in a few local areas (cf. the 
introduction). 
 
7. Concluding observations 
In this paper we have studied a reduced form moose-wolf ecological model where the size of 
the wolf population affects the moose population growth, but not vice versa, as the wolf 
population is controlled. Within this framework and in ecological equilibrium, it is 
demonstrated that the cost to landowners of moose predation strongly depends on their 
management goals. Two of the moose harvesting schemes considered yield reduced profit 
while the proportional scheme yields no clear conclusion. In addition to prices and costs, the 
critical factor here is the size of the harvested fraction. On the other hand, the fixed harvesting 
quota scheme yields always higher profit in the presence of predation. The reason for this is 
straightforward as predation reduces the moose stock, and hence browsing damage, while the 
number of animals harvested, and therefore the harvesting income, remains unchanged. 
Numerical examples from the Koppang area in Norway indicate that the recent predation 
pressure may reduce landowner profit by somewhat above 10% under the profit maximizing 
scheme. The loss may be higher under a proportional harvesting scheme. These results may 
be readily compared to Flaaten and Stollery (1996), who found that the reduced prey harvest 
in the Norwegian fisheries because of minke whale predation was somewhere between 3% 
and 7% of the gross profit of the cod and herring fisheries, respectively. 
 
The assessment of the landowner loss may be considered as an institutional situation where 
the landowners have property rights (hunting rights) over the moose population while being 
corrected for one externality, the public good value of the wolf population. When also 
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correcting for the external cost of moose–vehicle collisions, a form of social planner solution 
is studied. The break-even value of the wolf population alongside the social value of the 
moose population with and without predation may then be found. Under the baseline price 
and cost assumptions and a baseline predation pressure of 5%, we find this to be about 420 
(1000 NOK) when the landowner’s management plan is steered by profit maximization. 
Hence, on the given premises, if the in situ value of the wolf pack representing such a 
predation pressure is above 420, there is a social gain in predation. If represented by a wolf 
pack of, say, four-five individuals (which may be realistic), the per unit wolf value is quite 
modest. The break-even value increases under improved economic conditions for moose 
harvesting, while it decreases with a higher cost of traffic damage. These values may be 
compared to the Scandinavian contingent valuation studies (Dahle et al. 1987, Boman and 
Bostedt 1999) which indicates a much higher willingness-to-pay for the wolf existence value 
(but see footnote 1). The outcomes may also be seen in light of today’s harvesting practice in 
the Koppang area. Assuming that proportional harvesting represents the actual harvesting 
strategy with the harvesting fraction fixed as 0.3 (section 5), we find very much the same 
results as was found under the profit maximisation scheme.  
 
The analysis has been carried out assuming ecological equilibrium. Generally, this fits actual 
moose management practices in Scandinavia under all the harvesting strategies considered. 
Despite this, it may make sense to analyse the various management schemes within a dynamic 
framework. For example, it may be of interest to analyse if, and under what economic and 
ecological conditions, the proportional harvesting scheme may cause oscillations in the moose 
population. However, little comparative information about the various management schemes 
can be inferred from dynamic analysis as the cost of predation, not least because of 
discounting, critically hinges on the initial size of the moose population. 
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Table 1 
Landowner management. No predation 0Wα = . Population size (number of moose), harvest 
(number of moose) and profit (1,000 NOK) 
Management  
scheme   
Population size 
           X 
   Harvest 
           h 
    Profit 
        π  
a) Threshold 
harvesting 
( 1,750aX = ) 
         1,750          411         2,765 
b) Proportional 
harvesting ( 0.3γ = ) 
          1,266           380        2,659  
c)Fixed quota 
harvesting 
( 200ch = ) 
           3,004            200           699 
d) Profit 
maximising1) 
  
           1,610            409         2,786 
Table note 1: Steady-state and no discounting ( 0δ = )  
 
 
 
Table 2  
Landowner management. Baseline predation 0.05Wα = . Population size (number of moose, 
harvest (number of moose) and profit (1,000 NOK). In brackets:  Deviation from no predation 
alternative (%). 
Management  
Scheme 
Population size 
           X 
   Harvest 
           h 
      Profit 
         π  
a) Threshold 
harvesting 
( 1,750aX = ) 
        1,750           324 (-21)         2,065 (-25) 
b) Proportional 
harvesting ( 0.3γ = ) 
          894 (-29)          268 (-29)          1,877 (-29) 
c) Fixed quota 
harvesting 
( 200ch = ) 
         2,542 (-15)          200              837 (+21) 
d) Profit 
maximising1)  
 
          1,424 (-12)          326 (-20)           2,179 (-12) 
Table note 1: Steady-state and no discounting ( 0δ = )  
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Table 3. 
Landowner management. Predation 0.10Wα = . Population size (number of moose), 
harvesting (number of moose) and profit (1,000 NOK). In brackets:  Deviation no predation 
alternative (in %). 
Management  
Scheme 
Population size 
           X 
   Harvesting 
           h 
     Profit 
         π  
a) Threshold 
harvesting 
( 1,750aX = ) 
         1,750          236 (-43)        1,365 (-51) 
b) Proportional 
harvesting ( 0.3γ = ) 
            521 (-59)           156 (-59)          1,095 (-59) 
c)Fixed quota 
harvesting 
( 200ch = ) 
          2,017 (-33)           200             995 (+42) 
d) Profit 
maximising1)  
 
            1,238 (-23)            252 (-38)            1,647 (-41) 
Table note 1: Steady-state and no discounting ( 0δ = )  
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Social planner solution (steady-state) and landowner management harvesting scheme d), 
profit maximising (steady-state). Population size (number of moose), harvesting (number of 
moose), profit, traffic damage, social value wolf population and social surplus (all values in 
1,000 NOK) 
 Population 
size X 
Harvesting 
      h 
Landowner 
  profit π   
Traffic 
damage T 
Social 
value wolf 
population 
Social 
surplus S  
Profit 
maximising 
   1,610     409      2,786     1.610        -      1,176 
Profit 
maximising, 
taking 
traffic 
damage into 
account 
    1,145      362       2,553      1,145        -       1,408 
Social 
planner 
solution 
      959      279        1,947        959        VW    988+VW 
Table note: Steady-state and no discounting ( 0δ = ). Baseline predation pressure 
( 0.05Wα = ) social planner solution 
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Figure 1 
Natural growth F(X) and predation G(W,X). Harvest h and ecological equilibrium. 
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Figure 2  
Break-even in-situ wolf value VW (1,000 NOK) social planner  
solution. Baseline parameter values, increased hunting price  
(p shifts from 8,000 to 12,000 NOK per moose) and increased  
traffic damage cost (t shifts from 1,000 to 1,500 NOK per moose). 
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